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"WAR IS THE SPORT AND GAME OF KINGS."

"Our true glory, our growth, our freedom consists not in conquest, subject colonies, or militarism, but in the paths of liberty, industry, and peace."

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ARMY APPROPRIATION BILL—OUR RELATIONS WITH
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

SPEECH

OF

HON. ADOLPH MEYER,

OF LOUISIANA,

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1900.

WASHINGTON.

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SPEECH
OF
HON. ADOLPH MEYER,
OF LOUISIANA.

The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union and having under consideration the bill (H. R. 8582) making appropriation for the support of the Regular and Volunteer Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901—

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana said:

Mr. SPEAKER: I have no opposition to make to the features of the bill now before the House. I recognize that we have an army in the field, an army confronted with serious and grave dangers, and I would not say a word in antagonism to any reasonable plan or proposal to maintain that army until it has accomplished its work. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I will not address myself to the question of the appropriations embraced in the present bill, but to a question which may well be regarded as germane to it—our relations to and with the Philippine Islands and the course we should pursue concerning them.

I. WAR IS THE SPORT AND GAME OF KINGS.

Mr. Speaker, the war that has been going on in the Philippine Islands and the questions of public policy growing out of this war constitute grave and momentous issues for the American people, issues that may affect our destinies for all time to come. The American people come of a warlike stock, but they are not a war-loving people. The deplorable civil war between the States ended over thirty years ago. The war with Spain closed after a very brief struggle in the triumph of our arms. Peace jubilees followed at once all over the land. The good sense of the American people has steadily recognized peace as an inestimable blessing, and war, even when necessary, they regard as a great calamity. War is the sport and game of kings. Nobles and kings may well delight in war. They reap the honors and rewards. The heroism of the private soldiers all go to enhance the glory of monarch, nobles, and officers. The gallant deeds of the privates are known only to a few surviving comrades. The sacrifices and sufferings of the war, the grievous taxes paid, the impoverishment of the family, the loss to the wife and children of their sustaining prop and protector, the struggles of the maimed and crippled veteran to eke out a support, the burden of debt and taxation fastened on labor for generations to come—what has the monarch, the noble, or the rich contractor to do with all this? How can they sympathize with all these sufferings and hardships—they who have reaped only riches and fame from this widespread human misery?

If this be true in the case of the victors, how much worse is the case of the vanquished? The poor man, the peasant, the farmer, if he survives the war it is probably to find a desolated habitation,

perhaps only a blackened chimney to remind him of a once happy home, a beggared family, and, it may be, wrongs to his helpless family of which I dare not speak. If to his own fury and passions the conqueror adds the specious plea that he is the chosen instrument of God's wrath to punish some alleged crime of another nation or people, or that it is his duty to carry civilization and religion to distant lands by the military arm, then you may expect to witness a double installment of man's malice. If you doubt this, read the history of the so-called religious wars of Europe and Asia and the story of Roman and British conquests. Recall the names of Verres and the Roman proconsuls, of Clive and Hastings, Pizarro and Cortez, and some others of our own day and generation who have plundered, scourged, and oppressed a subject population. [Applause.]

II. NO DISHONOR IN TREATING WITH ALLEGED REBELS.

Our Revolutionary war of 1776 was a righteous war, one of self-defense, and for the right to govern ourselves. At the outset our petitions for peace and justice were "spurned from the foot of the throne." We were told that "rebels" in arms could not be treated with; that we must lay down our arms and submit. The terrible contest went on and on with varying fortunes, until finally the King of England condescended to treat with us. Peace and independence were the result. Sir, there is no dishonor, there can be none, in negotiating with alleged rebels or insurgents. If there were such dishonor, then England might have held out indefinitely. We have ourselves often made treaties of peace with Indian tribes who had defied our authority. The brave and the strong can always afford to be generous. The story of that period supplies another moral. France had helped us greatly. At the close we were exhausted, almost helpless, but she asked no pecuniary reward and no surrender of any territory as compensation for her powerful succor, and still less did she dream of selling out her allies, the American colonies, to any country for a sum of money, or of buying England's title to our shores. She quitted the fight clean-handed, with her honor unstained. No Frenchman need blush for that page of history.

III. POWER TO MAKE WAR RESTS WITH CONGRESS.

The American statesmen of that day had pondered well the lessons of history. They had seen kings make war again and again regardless of the people's wishes. They, therefore, refused to trust the President with the war-making power. They would not trust it to the Senate, high as that body was to be, and then deemed most unlikely to be influenced by patronage. They would not trust the power of making war even to the President and Senate combined. I am aware, sir, that there are some politicians of our day who claim that the President and Senate combined can by a treaty make a war and can even empower Congress to legislate in United States territory outside of the Federal Constitution; but this is not the doctrine of the good and great men who created our form of government. They, indeed, allowed the President and the Senate to make peace by the form of a treaty; but this power to make war, so solemn, so awful in its responsibilities, they would confide only to Congress. Therefore, in order to make war, it is necessary under our Constitution to have the concurrence of the people's immediate representatives, chosen every two years, and of the Senate, a body chosen by the State legislatures

and presumed to be more free from popular passion and excitement. Yet you have additional restraints upon the making war. If the President does not approve the act declaring war, two-thirds of each branch of Congress are necessary in order to overrule him and make it his duty to draw the sword. Sometimes a President is more conservative than Congress.

These limitations upon the war-making power are not mere empty forms. They concern the rights, the happiness, and the liberties of the people, to whom all public officials are not masters, but servants. Ours is or ought to be a government of public opinion. In order to ascertain that opinion, these forms were devised by statesmen compared with whom those of the present day fall very far short.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS OBSERVED IN WAR WITH SPAIN.

In the war with Spain these constitutional forms were observed. The President did not desire war. He did not undertake to make war. It is only justice to him to say that he strove to avert war by making demands which he thought Spain would concede. Finally, he reported the whole facts of the situation to Congress, making no specific recommendation, and devolving upon that body the responsibility of making the dread decision of war or peace. Congress acted promptly. Congress demanded that Spain should relinquish her authority in Cuba, and directed the President to employ, if necessary, the land and naval forces of the United States in order to carry the resolution into effect.

It was foreseen that this action would involve a war for the liberation of Cuba. In view of this contingency, Congress was careful to embrace in the joint resolution a declaration of our motives and purposes in this armed intervention. This was done in the most explicit language. Repelling the idea of some persons that our motive was merely greed for new territory, Congress positively disclaimed any purpose to exercise dominion over the island of Cuba except for its pacification, and pledged the republic when that pacification should be accomplished to leave the government of the island to its own people. Nothing was said of the other possessions of Spain. Our country knew nothing of the Philippine Islands and cared nothing about the struggles and disorders in that remote locality. There was no struggle at all in Puerto Rico as in Cuba—no revolt, no reports of discontent with Spanish rule. Now, it could not be supposed that while rejecting the rich and beautiful island of Cuba, in order to avouch the purity of our noble endeavor for its freedom, we should make any reservations, whether mental or verbal, that we would appropriate other colonies of Spain as compensation for a war alleged to be begun solely for the cause of humanity and civilization. It seems to me that the declaration of disinterestedness asserted in respect to Cuba ought to have been regarded as an expression of the policy of the two Houses of Congress and of the American people in relation to the whole war and its incidents. The war was not to be waged for money or territory, but for honor, for humanity, for civilization, and, as was well said by an eminent Senator, to "abate a nuisance." [Applause.]

War followed the President's signature on the 20th of April, 1898, to these pregnant resolves of Congress. As soon as Spain learned of the President's signature to the joint resolution requiring her to withdraw from Cuba, she proceeded to terminate all diplomatic relations with the United States. She notified Mr. Woodford, our

minister at Madrid, that the Spanish Government regarded this joint resolution as "equivalent to an evident declaration of war." This was done on April 21, 1898. On the following day, April 22, the President declared a blockade of certain Cuban ports, but he based this act and also his proclamation calling for volunteers upon the joint resolution by Congress of April 20 and upon an act of Congress approved April 22, 1898. It was felt, however, by all persons that as war was to ensue it ought to be preceded by an act of Congress. Following the spirit and text of the Constitution, the President on April 25, 1898, after reciting the precise situation of affairs, recommended to Congress the adoption of a resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain. Congress acted immediately on his suggestion, and that very day the President signed the resolution declaring war. Here was the authority for the war with Spain, in these two acts or resolutions of Congress dated the 20th and 25th of April, respectively, both passed pursuant to the Constitution. It was not a Presidential war or an act of usurpation, but a war made by the full authority of the American Congress.

I have been careful in reciting the various steps by which we went to war with Spain, because I wish you to compare them with the history of our present war in the Philippine Islands. Every step in making the war with Spain was in perfect accordance with constitutional forms. Congress declared war. Congress defined the causes and purposes of the war. These laws are inscribed on our statute book. The war thus constitutionally declared was supported by the American people regardless of party. The valor of our troops and sailors was worthy of our traditions as a martial people and was crowned with speedy and brilliant success. [Applause.]

But consider the war now being waged against the people of the Philippines. Was that war declared by Congress? Everyone knows the contrary to be the truth. Were its causes and purposes defined by Congress? Never! The legislative body could easily have been convened last spring. Under our Constitution, Congress can not meet in special session without a call of the President, but that act of assemblage by Congress would be a less stretch of power than the initiation of war or hostilities without the authority of Congress.

V. CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED.

The President could have summoned Congress to meet in March, 1899, to deal with all questions growing out of the Spanish war, but he would not do so; and thus this war in the Philippines, begun irregularly, has gone on day by day, with its catalogue of suffering and bloodshed, assuming as it progressed larger and larger proportions, until the Administration was obliged to employ 65,000 armed men in a war against a people on the opposite side of the globe! And all this is done without formally consulting Congress or the American people! I ask you, is this consistent with the American Constitution? Does it not violate that sacred instrument in one of its most vital provisions—the regulation of the great war-making power? I admit that when Congress is not in session we may be assailed and our rights invaded by a foreign government, and that in such cases the President is bound to protect American interests and, if necessary, to employ force for this purpose; but it is equally his duty in grave and serious

cases to convene Congress at once in extraordinary session to pass on the question of war and peace. His functions in such emergencies are defensive. It is for Congress only to convert defensive hostilities into war. In a monarchical government the sovereign may decline to summon the national legislature to his aid. He may deem himself wise and great enough to take into his own hands the question of war and peace. But our Government is not a monarchy. It is a republic; and we must reason strictly on that basis if we desire to preserve our birthright of freedom.

It may be said, however, that Congress was in session on the 4th of February, 1899, when hostilities began in the Philippines. This collision was a very serious event—an armed conflict with a people who but a short time before were as friendly to Americans as they had been hostile to Spain, and who had waged a noble battle for freedom which all of us had applauded. If, when this sad event occurred, the policy of the Government was to refuse all peace negotiation and to conquer by the sword the nine or ten millions of people residing in these islands, it was unquestionably the duty of the President to submit the facts to Congress and announce his plans for their consideration and decision. This is substantially what he so wisely did in respect to Cuba.

If he considered that, with only one short month of the session remaining and the great annual appropriation bills still not framed into laws, the Fifty-fifth Congress would not have the time required for the proper consideration of these great and new questions, it was easy for him to summon the Fifty-sixth Congress. That Congress had been chosen and could have been assembled in two weeks or even less time. In both bodies of that Congress there was a majority of the President's party friends. Surely it will not be said that in such a body as that there could not be found the wisdom to grapple with the problem. Remember that the war with Spain was closed entirely in 1898. Spain had submitted to our demands. The treaty of peace with her was ratified by the United States Senate early in February, 1899, and very soon afterwards by the Spanish Government. Obviously the time had now come for Congress to adjust all the questions growing out of the Spanish war—the disposition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and, more particularly, the Philippines—when prompt action by Congress might stay the further effusion of blood. In a public address, delivered at Boston the 16th of February last, the President declared that the final disposition of the Philippines belonged to Congress. By failing to summon Congress together he made himself the actual master of the situation.

Look at the precedents. Mr. Lincoln called Congress together in 1861. When in May, 1846, hostilities occurred on the Rio Grande between our forces and those of Mexico, President Polk laid the facts before Congress immediately and recommended the policy which Congress then adopted. Mr. Madison asked the consent of Congress before making war against Great Britain in 1812, although acts of hostility had previously occurred, and our flag had been fired upon. The examples of Presidents so distinguished ought to govern us, even if we had no written Constitution and were groping in the dark for the path of duty. If the Executive may conduct a foreign war for nine or ten months without the authority or direction of Congress, why may he not, on the plea of necessity or emergency, impose new taxes and customs duties, or perform any other function expressly assigned to Congress by the Federal Constitution? [Applause.]

VI. EVENTS PRECEDING HOSTILITIES.

Mr. Speaker, it is not my purpose to detain the House by reciting at length the history of events in the Philippines prior to the collision which in February last year led to the present unhappy conflict. That history in all important respects is reported in Senate Document No. 62 of the third session of the Fifty-fifth Congress. This document and the dispatches to the press tell the story of a general revolt against Spain in the island of Luzon, and a general occupation of the country by the insurgents prior to Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898. That document informs us how the insurgents in large numbers were encamped near Manila and threatening that city. Before Dewey sailed from the coast of Asia, overtures had been made by the United States officials at Singapore and Hongkong for the cooperation of Aguinaldo in the fight against Spanish power.

They arranged for an interview between Commodore Dewey and Aguinaldo before Dewey sailed. Dewey telegraphed in reply, "Tell Aguinaldo to come at once." It was pursuant to these arrangements for cooperation and alliance with the Americans that Aguinaldo went to Manila. Arriving there soon after Commodore Dewey's victory of May 1, 1898, he put himself in cooperation with Dewey and received arms and other aid from him. He put himself at the head of the insurgent forces and movement. He armed them largely with his own means, and at a time when the Americans had no land forces there he had driven the Spanish forces into Manila and closely invested the city on the land side, cutting off their supplies of food and water supply and harassing them with constant attacks. He was a friend and an ally—a valuable ally to the United States forces, for it was a good while before enough of our troops arrived at Manila to render his further cooperation unnecessary. All this time the relations of the United States officers and of the Filipinos were most friendly. It was at this time—the 29th of August, 1898—that Commodore Dewey wrote the Navy Department:

In a telegram sent to the Department on June 23 I expressed the opinion that these people are far superior in their intelligence and are more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion.

These favorable opinions of the Filipinos are confirmed by the recorded testimony of President Schurman, Professor Worcester, Mr. John Barrett, Gen. Charles A. Whitten, Gen. Charles King, and a number of eminent Americans familiar with the islands and their inhabitants.

On June 12, 1898, the Filipinos proceeded to hold a national council and to form a provisional government. They were then investing Manila on the land side. They had probably more men in arms than the colonies had at any one time from 1775 to 1783 in the struggle with Great Britain. A few days later, on June 23, Dewey telegraphed that this people were more capable of self-government than the Cubans. Is not this dispatch a proof that he was then in sympathy with their movement for self-government and independence? He certainly expressed no disapproval of the steps they were taking, nor did any other Army officer or official then representing the United States Government.

The Filipino government was formally proclaimed on the 23d June, 1898. A congress was provided for, which was to assemble at Malolos, in Luzon, about September 20, 1898. This was an independent government. Its formation was matter of world-wide notoriety. Its existence was known in Washington City almost

as well as at Manila. Yet no protest or objection was made against it by our Government or any of our officers. Generals Anderson and Merritt did not say a word against it. If there was any purpose on the part of our officials to hold on to these islands, or even to Luzon, would it not have been the fair thing to notify these people that they were going too far? Was it not natural and reasonable for them to assume that they would be allowed by us to indulge their ardent aspiration for a government of their own choice? How could they look upon us as mere vulgar conquerors and imitators of the Spaniards? They had a highly educated class among them who were probably familiar with our public declaration of disinterestedness in respect to Cuba and who concluded that we would pursue a like policy in regard to them. They had indeed done far more to achieve their independence than the Cubans had done. They held then all of Luzon save a few square miles containing the city of Manila. All their manifestoes and public declarations evinced a profound respect and admiration of the American Government and people.

It is somewhat difficult to fix the precise time when the scheme of annexing the Philippine Islands was resolved upon. At the very outset the British press sought to commit us to the retention of the Philippines and to the imperial policy. It has been asserted that British diplomacy was exerted to the same end, possibly with a view to a broader and more far-reaching alliance by which her interests were to be promoted and guarded. All this ran counter to the wise counsels of Washington and Jefferson. If the President agreed with this policy he did not declare it to Congress when it met in December, 1898. In his annual message, dated December 5, 1898, he said that he—

would not discuss at that time the government or the future of the new possessions which will come to us as the result of the war with Spain. Such discussion will be appropriate after the treaty of peace shall be ratified.

The spirit of this remark was wise and in conformity to the genius of our institutions. [Applause.]

It is true that as early as October 31, 1898, our commissioners at Paris demanded of Spain the cession of these islands, but the fact was not officially made known to Congress until by the President's message to the Senate of January 4, 1899. The terms of the treaty were, however, generally understood, prior to this, to include the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain for the sum of \$20,000,000, and this fact, coupled with some of the President's public addresses, was well calculated to alarm and disquiet the Filipino people. Thus the relations of the two parties in Luzon, though not hostile, became much strained, not to say unfriendly. But no formal issue had been made. The President was not yet formally committed to annexation. The treaty itself had not been ratified. The Senate might perhaps amend it, or, if the Senate preferred to ratify it as it stood rather than run the risk of prolonging a costly war with an unsettled state of affairs following, the President might still turn over to Congress the momentous question of settling the destinies of the nine or ten millions of people living in these islands. It was an easy matter to make the payment of the twenty millions a basis for the native government surrendering to us such naval station or stations as we might desire and reimburse us the twenty millions as their revenues might permit. This sum was a small amount compared with what we had expended in order to free Cuba from Spanish rule.

The Filipinos would probably have been only too happy to make such arrangements with us and maintain their self-government under an American protectorate. These people probably reasoned on these lines of thought, for all during the month of January, 1899, they maintained a diplomatic representative at Washington City. He was not received, though he represented a people who had been our allies during the war with Spain. I mean allies in fact and in friendly feeling and with a cordial understanding.

VII. THE FATAL COLLISION.

I come now to the unfortunate collision which ensued between the American troops and the Filipinos on February 4, 1899. It was an affair of outposts. There is much dispute as to who were the aggressors, into which question I do not care to enter. But there are some historical facts pertinent to this event which are undisputed. The treaty of peace with Spain ceding us the Philippines, to which she had only a technical and a paper title, without any actual possession whatever, was signed on December 10, 1898, at Paris. On December 21, 1898—that is to say, before the treaty was communicated to the United States Senate—the President issued positive instructions to the Secretary of War to be promulgated in the Philippines. He stated therein that the destruction of the Spanish fleet, followed by the capture of Manila, had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands; that Spain had ceded these islands to the United States, and that under the rights of sovereignty thus acquired the “actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands” had become “immediately necessary,” and that “the military government previously maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila was to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.”

Now, at this very time the military lines and occupation of the Filipinos covered nearly the whole of the island of Luzon—all of it, indeed, save Manila and a very few square miles near by, which constituted hardly a hundredth part of the whole island. The Filipino government had been in actual operation over six months, with its capitol located at the city of Malolos, in Luzon, and governing the island, with the full consent of the United States authority. The language of the proclamation undoubtedly meant that these people were to give up their own government, disband their armies, and submit implicitly to the United States military forces of which General Otis was the head. If they should not at once and unanimously give up their government and disband all their armies, conflict was inevitable. In case of resistance “firmness” and “severity” were to be employed. Such language can have but one meaning. The Filipinos, or many of them, probably construed it to mean war. Certainly such an interpretation on their part was very natural.

It deserves to be specially noted that this document was not sent to the United States Senate until the 4th of January, 1899. It was then sent in as a confidential document or with confidential papers. It was promulgated in Manila on the same day it went to the United States Senate.

Would it not have been a wiser course, instead of this order requiring “immediate” action by our army in Luzon, for the Executive to maintain the status quo in the islands, holding on to Manila and any other point then in our actual possession, and leaving to the Filipinos, our late allies, the temporary occupation

of the remainder of the island, which by their heroism and sacrifices they had wrested from Spain? This state of things had existed for over six months with peace and good will. Surely it could well be suffered to continue at least until the Senate should have acted on the treaty and until Congress should make some decision as to the future of these islands, as was apparently contemplated by the President in his annual message to Congress. What public interest would have suffered by a course of patience and conciliation?

With this proclamation, so well calculated to alarm and irritate this people who had indulged a fond dream of independence, it is indeed strange that the Filipino leaders should have been able to restrain their followers as long as they did. Even after the collision of February 4, 1899, there is ground for the belief that the leaders would have been very glad to make a pacific arrangement, but there was no disposition to accept anything but their unqualified submission. I shall not recite the history of the war. Our armies were reenforced to the number of 65,000 men. Our Navy gallantly cooperated. The American soldiers showed, as all expected, that they knew how to fight for their flag. The Filipinos have shown that they also know how to make sacrifices and, if need be, to die for their independence. Both sides have suffered greatly.

The island of Luzon has been overrun with the usual waste and havoc, and the Filipinos are now split up into small bands. Resistance is not yet extinguished, but it may be extinguished. On the other hand, some of our best military men say that the war will go on indefinitely. The manner in which ten or fifteen thousand insurgents in Cuba kept up a contest with Spain and her army of 200,000 men for ten or more years shows the great difficulty to be expected in suppressing resistance in a tropical country, with jungles, morasses, swamps, and mountains for the natives to retreat to and make a stand. It is utterly vain now to attempt a prophecy about the military situation. I should be glad if this suffering and misery could be brought to a close, but I fear the end is not yet near at hand.

Much as I deplore the waste and havoc of war, the loss of valuable lives, the burden of grievous taxation and increased public debt, there are, to my mind, other evils which may come to us from this unfortunate situation. We are confronted with the serious question whether we are to leave these people to their own government or whether we are to rule them as subjects. It is not now proposed by anybody to admit these people to our citizenship or to allow them to become at any time a governing power in our confederated Republic. No, sir. The proposition is to treat them as subjects, perhaps by the military arm, perhaps by the form or pretense of a civil government, the latter to be reenforced by the sword if necessary. How many troops are to be used for our permanent army of occupation we are not told: nor the cost, nor how long this state of things is to last. But it is obvious that the leaders of the Republican party are fully committed to the plan of holding these islands by the strong hand of power at any and all cost of blood and treasure. They even go so far as to assert that Congress has a right to legislate for these islands outside of the Constitution. In their creed our noble Constitution is a movable feast, and not the daily bread by which the spirit of liberty is to be fed. Yet many of those who now uphold this strange doctrine

not long ago stood up in this very Hall and swore before God to support and obey the Constitution of the United States.

VIII. THE PLEA OF A LARGER TRADE WITH THE ORIENT.

The pleas upon which we are to adopt this new policy of conquest and empire are utterly devoid of truth and logic. Such especially is the claim that our trade with the Orient will be largely enhanced and become exceedingly profitable. It is said that we must have new markets and that the trade of these islands is but a stepping-stone to that of China. It is over 600 miles from Manila to Hongkong, and it is hard to see any connection between the trade with Manila and that with China. Vessels going to China do not touch at Manila; it is far out of the way. I admit, I recognize the great importance of our present trade with China. I admit and can easily foresee that if our rights and interests are properly cared for our prospective trade with China may swell to grand proportions, and perhaps in time equal or surpass our present trade with Europe. Why do I say this? Because China is inhabited by four or five hundred millions of an industrious, energetic race, who live in a temperate climate like our own and who are just beginning to adopt the industrial arts by which a people become rich and powerful. They are keen traders and industrious artisans.

At present the body of the population live on very scanty wages; they produce very little per capita. Consequently they have not a great deal at present to offer in exchange, and all commerce rests on an exchange of surplus products. Their production will increase rapidly—perhaps I may say dangerously—and with the surplus products to export they will be able and willing to import. But, sir, I am reminded that it is already announced that the State Department has concluded arrangements with foreign powers by virtue of which if they hold or acquire territory in China, or have what is called “spheres of influence” our wares and merchandise are to suffer no prejudice, but are to be admitted freely into China, as heretofore. I fear very much that such understanding may have very little practical value when the crisis arises.

If, however, I am mistaken in this and our future commerce is well guarded, then we may dismiss the Philippines as a factor in the China trade. If, however, as may well turn out, our trade in and with China is to be discriminated against by rapacious European powers who are now actively grabbing Chinese territory, then our power to protest and repel such injustice and injury to our trade will not be augmented by our being loaded up with a rebellious set of colonies in the Philippines, which we are to watch, guard, and keep in order. The energies, the money, the military and naval power already expended in the conquest of the Philippines might very well be reserved for employment in the great and important problem now looming up before us, namely: Are we to have the trade with China to which we are fairly entitled by reason of our varied products, the skill and energy of our people, and our favorable position on the Pacific Ocean? Does it not look, sir, as if we were sacrificing substance for shadow in our frantic struggles to absorb the Philippines? [Applause.]

IX. VALUE OF THE PHILIPPINES' TRADE.

The trade with the Philippines—how much is it worth? How much can it be worth to us as compared with our trade in other directions? Well, you will not, under a free-trade or “open-door”

policy. have any special advantages. The European nations, by virtue of the Suez Canal, are nearer to the Philippines than we are or will be until perhaps a canal is built across the Isthmus. But assume that after annexing the Philippines we impose a tariff sufficient to give us the control of the whole import trade. It would give us very little. According to the last returns, when the island of Luzon was at its best, the total foreign trade was only about \$30,000,000, and our profit on it would be a mere bagatelle compared with the cost of ownership—the Army and Navy needed to suppress revolts and protect our new possessions. It may be said that this small trade of the islands, with nine or ten millions of people, was because everything was blighted or repressed by Spanish rule.

There may be something in this point, but I read that under Spanish rule Cuba was once a very rich island and had a very valuable trade. I beg you to remember that the great body of the people of the Philippines have very few wants. They are very near the equatorial line; the climate is hot. In such climates there is little demand for animal food. A little rice and bread goes a long way. Warm clothing is not required, nor much clothing of any kind. The body of the people live in very cheap habitations. They have very few wants. They can live comfortably and have all the necessities of life on 5 to 10 cents per day. All tropical experiences and reports go to show that under such conditions the inferior races—the African, Indian, and Malay races—will not work any more than is absolutely necessary to make a bare support. They will produce no surplus for export. They do not care for your civilization or your artificial wants, the product of a high civilization. They will not work to accumulate. The Mongolian adventurers or laborers may be more industrious. They constitute a little over a twentieth part of the whole population of the islands.

Suppose, however, that by some magic you can recreate the people of Luzon and give them the wants and cravings of our own people and that they will then go to work and produce something wherewith to trade with you. What will it be? What can they produce that we will want? As the able gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] pointed out lately in this House, will not the new and augmented productions involve a dangerous competition with our own industries by a class of laborers who can live well on 10 cents a day while our laborers expect a dollar and upward? Look at their products. What are they? In the first place, there is the product of sugar. There was a time in our history when Louisiana produced one-half of the sugar the country consumed.

Now we have the competition of beet sugar—I mean the American beet-sugar industry. This is a fair rivalry, of which Louisiana does not complain. But you are letting in the coolie and slave or contract grown sugar of the Hawaiian Islands duty free, and you will soon let in free the pauper-grown sugar of Puerto Rico. Your next step is to develop sugar in the Philippines and crush out the beet-sugar industry of the Pacific coast and the cane sugar of Louisiana. Do you propose to carry the negro laborers of Louisiana to the Philippines after you have starved them out? Suppose you develop the growth of tobacco. Will that help the tobacco grown in Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, or Connecticut? Are the profits of this class, burdened so heavily already by your internal-revenue tax, so large that you must needs

spend the resources of the whole Union in order to break them down by the competition of Malays and Mongolians?

X. INFLUENCE UPON MARKET FOR COTTON AND OTHER PRODUCTS.

It has been suggested by some inconsiderate people that we could have a profitable market for our cotton in the Philippines. It would be far wiser to send our coals to Newcastle. Living in a tropical clime, these people have little need for clothing and would consume very little cotton; but with industry on their part, or, what is more likely, on the part of Chinese and Japanese laborers, they can, in all probability, produce cotton of the best quality. They had produced long-staple cotton until the Spanish Government stepped in and arrested the production. They can resume this product and develop it, beyond a doubt. With the Chinese and Japanese, if not with native Malay labor, they can manufacture this cotton, paying 5 or 10 cents per day for their operatives. How would this sort of "expansion" benefit New England or South Carolina or Georgia or other States in which the manufacture of cotton goods is a profitable industry? Is this your "white man's burden" that you are so eager to assume?

I consider, sir, that the argument of the Representative from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] is conclusive on this subject, and that if the production of these islands is to be stimulated, it will be on agricultural lines and will form a competition with home industries that are now barely able to maintain themselves under a system of taxation that has little regard for the farmer or the planter.

There is one other industry in which our people are even more likely to suffer. I refer to the hemp-growing industry, a most important one in some of our Western States. This industry has already been developed in Luzon; and if peace ever comes, then, by the aid of Chinese labor, it will be a formidable competitor with our own hemp-growing industry.

XI. TROPICAL TRADE.

Sir, there is a wide misapprehension in respect to the relative value of a tropical trade. In order to estimate it properly, it may be well to consider where our exports go. It will be found, sir, that they go chiefly to countries lying in temperate regions—to races like our own—energetic, intelligent, industrious, and who have developed the wants and needs of a high civilization. Now, for the calendar year 1898 our total exports were \$1,255,546,266; for the year 1899, they were \$1,275,499,671. I take the latter year. Of this last sum we sent to Europe, \$959,234,520. We sent to France, \$70,107,127; to Germany, \$161,405,852, and to the Netherlands, \$83,601,438. To Great Britain we sent \$509,958,335. We sent to British North America, \$88,284,778.

Now, compare these exports with our exports to tropical countries: To Brazil, with its enormous area and varied production, we sent \$11,453,997: to all the West Indies, lying right at our door, \$44,071,055; to Cuba, although at peace, we sent only \$24,861,261. It may be said that Cuba was still suffering from the war. Then turn to Mexico, peaceful, orderly, and progressive. She took from us only \$29,309,802. It is a very large country, with considerable variety of soil and products and with our railroads running through the country, but she needed only twenty-nine millions of our exports. Mexico is a tropical or semitropical country, and her people have different wants from our own or from Canada, to which we sent some \$88,000,000.

To the Philippine Islands we exported \$69,459 in 1897. That was prior to our war with Spain. In 1898 we exported \$147,846, and last year only \$1,663,213, though we had a large army there. There is nothing to prove that we can ever expect to have a large export trade with the Philippine Islands compared with what we may expect with South America, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Central America. As compared with our export trade to Europe and our prospective exports to China, the possibilities of our export trade with the Philippines are absolutely insignificant. But if tropical trade is to dominate our imagination and control our policy, it would be far better to see what we can do in the West Indies, or Mexico, or Central America, or in South America, or tropical Africa, instead of wasting our blood and treasure in building up customers in Luzon. Our present policy there may lead to some large demand for mourning goods, but that wretched people will not be able to buy them.

I repeat it, sir, we should avail ourselves of our great natural advantages and proximity to Cuba and the West Indies, to Mexico, Central America, and the South American governments. Our political relations with Mexico and South America are cordial. Practically these governments are, by virtue of the Monroe doctrine, placed under an American protectorate. We say to Europe, "Stand off; no land grabbing there." With such relations, with a study of their markets and requirements, our people ought to be able to absorb much the larger portion of the trade with South America, the West Indies, and Mexico. Here is a prize indeed, but let it be pursued by the arts of peace. The sword is not needed. Let American skill, invention, and genius solve the problem. There may perhaps be legislative aids to such trade, which I have not now the time to discuss. But I hope that there will be no effort by our Government to develop trade with those countries at the expense of our own struggling agricultural industries.

XII. A SUMMARY.

In the remarks I have submitted I have endeavored to show that, starting out with the proposition that war, even when necessary, is an awful calamity and sacrifice, we have drifted into this present war against the people of the Philippines without any necessity and occasion for it: that they were our allies in the fight with Spain: that they were most friendly and cordial toward the Government and people of the United States; that the government they set up at Malolos, in the island of Luzon, was organized without objection from our officers in Luzon or from the Washington Administration; that they had every reason to suppose it would be recognized; that this government operated for over six months all over the island of Luzon save a very few square miles including the city of Manila, and that the attempt to overthrow it and substitute therefor a military government of the United States Army was an act premature and tending to conflict, and was never authorized and approved by Congress, to which body, under our Constitution, belonged the settlement of the whole matter. I recall these facts, not with any feeling of acrimony or to impute bad motives to others, but to show that the policy pursued has been most unwise and unfortunate.

At this stage of affairs, after a year of costly war in Luzon, we are confronted with the grave questions: Are these islands to be permanently held as a part of our possessions either as a subject colony or as an incipient State or States of the Union? Very few

persons, if any, propose the latter scheme at this time, but as there are no limits to human folly some will probably urge it in the future. The great body of the so-called "expansionists" propose to hold the Philippines as dependencies and to govern them as England governs India, Ceylon, and Jamaica—that is, by military force—or as France dominates Madagascar. The advocates of this plan rest their case chiefly on the commercial argument that this "forcible annexation" would promote our trade with China and would also give us a valuable trade with these islands themselves.

I think that I have shown successfully that there is nothing in the so-called commercial argument: that the only trade possible with the islands, if it could be developed, would be to stimulate dangerous competition with our own agricultural industries by the growth of hemp, sugar, tobacco, and cotton; that so far from aiding our trade with China the retention of a colony of rebellious subjects would, by requiring an army and navy to be kept there, embarrass us in the attempt to enforce our rights and interests in respect to the great prospective trade of China, and finally, that there are large and fertile countries to the southward, such as Cuba, Mexico, Central America, Brazil, and others, far more worthy of our attention and where trade would be more easily secured.

The commercial argument, therefore, is opposed to all our experience and to common sense and is shown to be worthless. It has rested on the pure assumption of hasty and ignorant declaimers. Unless this argument can be shown to be perfectly well founded, it can not be counted against the cost of the war, the evils of a colonial system, the growth of militarism, and the serious injury to our form of government—the abandonment of the republican idea and the adoption by us of European ideas and methods of government. It must also be considered that if we are going into the business of land-grabbing and conquest in Asiatic waters, we weaken the position and arguments by which we have heretofore maintained the Monroe doctrine in North and South America. The two policies are absolutely contradictory. In the one case we forbid conquests and forcible annexation by others; in the other case we employ 65,000 soldiers and our Navy to work out a conquest over an unwilling people 7,000 miles off, who desire independence. We set the example of the very policy we object to in European governments.

XIII. COST OF THE WAR.

What, sir, is the cost of the war in the Philippines? All the orators who favor imperialism seem to shrink from giving us this important information. Is it because they do not regard the question of fifty or a hundred millions of dollars per annum as worthy of consideration by the American taxpayers, or is it because they feel that it would be a dangerous branch of the subject for them to discuss? We have no estimates from any of them on this subject. We are called on to plunge into this new policy without considering whether it will or will not increase the public burdens. I may remark right here that the estimates of cost from the opponents of imperialism have not been challenged, so far as I know. I believe, sir, that the Army of the United States, in proportion to its numbers, is more expensive than that of any other country. The estimate of cost per man, taking officers and men together, is \$1,000 per man for a year. As we have 65,000 men in the Philippines, that alone would mean \$65,000,000.

But when you consider that all your men, munitions of war, food, and other supplies must be transported 7,000 miles from our coast, it is apparent that the expense of the war must be fully one hundred millions per annum, especially if you include the unusual expenses for the Navy. This does not include the prospective expense from pensions. Considering the climate and the character of the service, this charge must be very large, even if there were to be no further combats or special exposure on the part of the troops. Probably no troops have ever had to undergo greater hardship and exposure since the days of the French invasion of Russia by Napoleon. The estimates of some good judges place the cost of this war at \$150,000,000 per annum. One thing is certain, the actual cost of war almost always outruns expectations or estimates. No one ever dreamed the Spanish war would cost as much as it did.

It may be urged, sir, that the cost of the war and of retaining the Philippines will be much less hereafter. A people who have held our Army at bay for over a year and are still fighting us will, in any case, require a large army of occupation. Luzon is a large island. It is 40,000 square miles, and the country presents every facility for insurrectionary operations—more, even, than Cuba. It would be necessary to keep up garrisons all over the islands and to protect their communications. You would require fortifications, not only against the natives, but against all possible antagonists. You would need a strong naval force. The expense of occupation could not be brought much below a hundred millions of dollars.

XIV. QUI BONO?

But this is not all. After you have done it all—put down all resistance, conciliated the people you are crushing, and caused them to love you—have you not given a hostage to fortune? Is not Hawaii now at the mercy of any European government with whom you may have a war? Would not the Philippines be even more exposed? Can you say that you will have no war hereafter with any strong power? You have had actual hostilities with France in the past, and strained relations with Germany not long ago, and with Italy also. With Great Britain you have had two long and bloody wars and a number of difficulties leading to the very verge of war. You have still unsettled questions with her. What is your naval power? We are greatly inferior to France and Russia, and are outranked by Great Britain eight or ten to one. We are now about equal in sea power to Germany, but if the naval programme of the German Government be carried out we will be much inferior to that Government two or three years from now. Italy is perhaps not quite equal to us, but a combination of Italy and Austria is not unreasonable. If we fought one we would have to fight both. Japan will probably be stronger than we are on sea two or three years from now.

Those are not pleasant facts, but they are undeniable. So that unless we greatly increase our naval armament our new possessions will be cut off from us in case of war. It follows that no matter how clear our cause of quarrel, we will be hampered in case of war by this new imperial policy. In this connection it is well to reflect that two-thirds of our whole Army is now in the Philippines. A considerable portion of our Navy is also there. It would take much time and expense to bring them home. Is it not obvious that while we have by this unfortunate policy multiplied

the chances of war with other powers we have really lessened our war-making power and diminished our security at home against a foreign foe? Instead of protecting our grand home country on the Atlantic and the Pacific, we shall have to guard Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, or at least so much of the latter as we now occupy. There is a very large part of the Philippine group, say one-half of the whole, where we have made no attempt whatever at occupation. There the savage polygamist roams at will—his own sweet will.

I think, sir, that if we are to pursue the policy on which we are entering, a regular army of at least one to two hundred thousand men will be required and a navy at least four or five times what we now possess. More than that, we will need a British or some other alliance to guard against any possible combination against us. It would not be enough for us to be strong. We would have to combine with one or more powers. I need not tell you, sir, that such an alliance with England or other countries would involve concessions by us and bargains and sacrifices that nobody now could foresee. I believe that the advice of Washington to avoid "entangling alliances" embodies a sound national policy and is yet dear to all patriotic Americans. [Applause.]

I wish to say here that if three years ago any man had predicted that the United States Government would send an army of 65,000 soldiers across the seas to conquer a people of eight or ten millions of another race, with the purpose to hold them as a subject colony, he would have been regarded either as a madman or a slanderer of the American people and their Government.

XV. FACE TO FACE WITH MILITARISM.

We are now brought face to face with militarism. Some twenty years ago a great railroad president publicly advocated an army of 40,000 men. It was after a great strike of employees. The proposition was justly scouted as a monstrous departure from our traditional policy of a small standing army. Now we are invited to adopt the colonial system of European monarchs and the system of militarism and great armies which has been the curse of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, and all the Continent. Even England is not free from it. She is now busy sending 150,000 to 200,000 soldiers many thousand miles by sea to conquer two little republics in South Africa, and is spending at the rate of three or four hundred millions of dollars per year in an unnecessary war. It is this system of "militarism" which has driven so many good men to this country which we are now called on to imitate in this favored land. Sir, I fear that it means much more than foreign conquest. It means the subversion of our free institutions, the rule of the sword, and the reduction of our workingmen to the condition of vassalage exceeding that proposed for the Philippines. It means an absolute conquest of labor by the forces of capital.

XVI. GRAND RESULTS OF LEGITIMATE "EXPANSION."

An attempt is made to cover up this policy of imperialism and militarism by the employment of the mild phrase "expansion." Sir, there is no objection from any quarter to legitimate expansion, such as the expansion of this grand Republic from 1789 up to the advent of this unhappy war. It was an expansion in territory—contiguous and unsettled territory—expansion in wealth, commerce, population, power, science, invention, in all the won-

derful arts of peace, by an intelligent, free, and liberty-loving population. This expansion has been the wonder and admiration of the world. It has lifted us from the position of a feeble Republic with some three millions of people in 1783 to the rank of a first-class power, able to face any nation on the earth in a just quarrel. Yes, "a world power"—not because we have coveted foreign territory all over the world, but because there was no power in the world that dared to do us a wrong. A "world power" because our political ideas and example had permeated the thoughts of men all over the civilized world, gained for the common people a better recognition of their rights, and pointed the way to the liberation and advancement of all mankind. A nation that could do this by purely moral force was more than a world power in modern vulgar acceptation. [Great applause.]

When was there ever such expansion as ours? We subdued the forest and the field; we conquered all obstacles between us and the Pacific; we dominated the forces of nature or harnessed them to our chariot. We did all this without the sacrifice of our free Constitution, without wrong or injustice to other nations, without making a king out of a president or invading the grand sovereign power of the American people.

All honor to this expansion, an expansion not half completed, hardly begun, and destined to go on so long as American genius, force, and industry shall live under free institutions. But we must be careful not to suffer to be substituted for our American expansion the cheat, the bastard child of European imperialism.

XVII. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE.

The large territorial acquisitions we have made on this continent were all made fairly and honorably. Our first acquisition was the great Louisiana purchase by Thomas Jefferson—a vast domain sold to us by France and practically unoccupied at the time we acquired it. There were in Louisiana—I mean the present limits of the State—a few thousand whites who freely accepted our rule, and outside there were large areas over which numerous savage and nomadic tribes wandered, camped, and fought, without order, progress, cities, farms or civilization. The country was contiguous to our western borders. It was the natural outlet for our advancing settlements, and was capable of being molded into great and prosperous States composed of a white and homogeneous population. We introduced no dangerous or incongruous elements into our political system. The acquisition of Florida was in like fashion. Texas was a free and independent State composed mainly of white people, which sought our political embrace. It has grown to be a great Commonwealth. California and New Mexico were occupied by our forces during the Mexican war. They were very sparsely settled. They might have been claimed and held by us as a war indemnity, but we paid Mexico for this territory, and now they are settled by a vigorous and enterprising white race of our own blood. In all this there was no vulgar greed of conquest. They were contiguous countries, practically unsettled and unoccupied, and were capable of being fashioned by immigration into homogeneous American communities, as they have been.

To assert that these honorable, natural, and wise acquisitions of territory on our own continent resemble the proposed forcible annexation of the inferior races, some 9,000,000 or more, inhabiting the Philippine Islands, 7,000 miles from our western shores and densely populated, is to insult the popular intelligence. What alien, hostile, and incongruous nations and organized communities



did we subjugate in order to acquire Texas, California, Florida, and Louisiana? What peoples did we conquer, overrun, and ravage in order to deprive them of their government and to substitute our own?

Let it not be forgotten that the Philippine Islands are 7,000 miles away from our extreme western coast, that their total area is only 114,000 square miles, and that they are already more densely populated than Ohio or New York by a population who do not desire our rule, but are resisting it and sacrificing property and life itself to maintain their independence. Is not this policy one of imperialism? Will anybody say it is republicanism—the republicanism of our fathers? In what does it differ from the policy of British, German, or French imperialism? How does it differ from the British policy in India or in South Africa? We subjugate alien and inferior races many millions in number: we govern them by the sword as subjects, and yet we shrink from the little word “imperialism.” It is not necessary, however, to discuss terms or phrases when you once discard liberty, set aside your free Constitution, and enthrone a government of force and despotic authority.

Is it true that empire is the real and final goal and outcome of all free republics? Is our old logic false, our Constitution a mistake or out of date, and the immortal Declaration an inconvenient reminiscence—a threadbare garment which fashion and interest require us now to discard? Is our creed henceforth to be the right of the stronger power, not the divine principle of justice? The Monroe doctrine, long so hateful to European monarchies—is it to be discarded as mere rubbish? For if the idea of foreign conquests and forcible annexations is to prevail, we will certainly find it very hard to hold on to the Monroe doctrine.

XVIII. OUR TRUE GLORY.

There is another and a better way than all this folly. Our true glory, our growth, our freedom consist not in conquest, subject colonies, or militarism, but in the paths of liberty, industry, and peace. Every great power desires our friendship. Pursuing our old methods, what have we to fear from any one of them? What need of a great standing army, of war and conscription, or of a great absolute government governing colonies by the sword, repeating all over the world the cruelties and the wholesale corruptions which have so often stained the pages of history and from which it was our proud boast that we were entirely free? We have reached, I believe, the turning point in our national history. We can stand by the old Constitution and the old ways, or we can enter upon the new paths—new to us, but long familiar to the infamous despots of the Old World. The new programme of colonies and imperialism involves a deadly conflict with the very genius of free government and with all the fundamental principles of our free institutions.

The issue is so momentous, so immediate and pressing, that it can not be obscured by questions of currency and tariff, however important they may be. The issue is before the American people to-day for their decision. Heretofore they have not had the opportunity to pass upon it, but they will ere long be heard from, and I can not doubt their verdict. It will be, I believe, for liberty, the Constitution, and the Union, without any admixture of imperialism, huge standing armies, militarism, conscriptions and wars, or entangling alliances with foreign powers. [Great applause on the Democratic side.]